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Ecological-Evolutionary Theory and Societal Transformation  
in Post-Communist Europe 
 
GERHARD LENSKI* 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
Abstract: Ecological-evolutionary theory offers a unique and distinctive perspec-
tive on societal change.In particular, it draws attention to the enormous and revolu-
tionary power of technological innovations as a source of change. Some of the 
implications of this for the post-Communist societies of middle and eastern Europe 
are then considered. Ecological-evolutionary theory also offers a unique and distinc-
tive perspective on human nature, and the implications of this are also discussed. 
Czech Sociological Review, 1996, Vol. 4 (No. 2: 149-156) 
Introduction 
At the end of the nineteenth century and in the early years of the twentieth, the social sci-
ences gradually abandoned the evolutionary perspective that had been dominant up to that 
point. They did so for a number of reasons, a few of which still seem justified although 
most now appear dubious.  
Then, surprisingly, after decades of rejection, attitudes began to shift in the 1960s. 
Some came to recognize that evolutionary theories have one invaluable feature that other 
theories lack: they compel us to take account in our thinking of the total range of human 
experience – not simply that little segment with which we are familiar in our own lives 
and immediate experience. For this reason, they provide a far more solid foundation on 
which to build a science of human societies and, thus, also, a unique and valuable tool for 
understanding social change, especially the more fundamental and far-reaching transfor-
mations of societies.  
In this paper, I provide a brief introduction to one version of the new evolutionism 
and then explore some of its implications for societal development and change in the 
Czech Republic and the other societies of middle and eastern Europe which, until re-
cently, were governed by Communist regimes.  
Basic Features of Ecological-Evolutionary Theory 
Currently, there are several versions of the new evolutionism in western social science. 
The one on which I focus in this paper is known as ecological-evolutionary theory and 
builds on foundations laid by the Scottish social philosophers of the eighteenth century, 
especially Millar and Ferguson. Their work was developed and extended in important 
ways later in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by various archaeologists, espe-
cially Thomsen and Childe.  
Ecological-evolutionary theory can be described as a qualified materialist theory, 
since it views three sets of material factors as the primary forces shaping the life of hu-
man societies, but not as the only ones. The first of these is our species’ genetic heritage 
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which is shared by the members of every society and is responsible for all or most of the 
characteristics that are common to all societies (e.g., the use of language, moral codes, the 
division of labor along age and sex lines). Second, there are the biophysical environments 
to which societies must adapt, which have been responsible for many of the differences 
among societies in the past and still contribute to differences today (e.g., differences in 
levels of development between societies in the tropics and those in temperate regions, or 
the differences between societies in oil-rich areas and those in resource-poor regions). 
Finally, there are the technologies that societies possess that enable them to satisfy their 
members’ varied needs and desires. These have been the basic engine of change over the 
course of human history and they have become the most important determinant of societal 
differences. 
While acknowledging that other variables, such as ideologies and social structures, 
have, and have had, considerable influence on societies, especially in the shorter run, 
when the experience of human societies is viewed in its entirety (i.e., from prehistoric 
times to the present, and for humankind as a whole), it is hard to avoid the conclusion that 
the primary determinants of the most basic characteristics of human societies have been 
the three sets of factors that ecological-evolutionary theory emphasizes and that other fac-
tors are best understood as intervening or dependent variables [Heise et al. 1976; Nolan 
and Lenski 1995].  
To appreciate the enormous importance of technology, for example, one need only 
compare Stone Age societies of the past with modern industrial societies: the differences 
between them in size, wealth, productivity, nature and extent of the division of labor, 
rates of invention and discovery, degree of social inequality, and human health and lon-
gevity, to name but a few, have all been enormous [Lenski et al. 1995]. The power of 
technology is evident not merely in comparisons of Stone Age societies with modern in-
dustrial societies, it is equally evident in advanced societies of the modern era. For exam-
ple, as Table 1 indicates, advances in agricultural technology in the United States in the 
last two centuries have dramatically increased agricultural productivity, and this, in turn, 
has led to a radical transformation of the American labor force and caused the rapid 
growth of urbanization. It has also contributed enormously to improvements in health and 
longevity and in the standard of living. 
Table 1. Productivity of American agriculture, 1800-1990 
 Number of worker-hours required: Percentage 
Production of: 1800 1910-1917 1990 reduction 
100 bushels of wheat 373 106 6 98.2 
100 bushels of corn 344 135 3 99.0 
1 bale of cotton 601 276 4 99.4 
1,000 pounds of milk n/a* 38 2 95.1 
1,000 pounds of beef n/a* 46 9 81.1 
1,000 pounds of chicken n/a* 95 1 99.2 
*) Not ascertained. 
Sources: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States, 
Colonial Times to 1970, Series K 445-485; U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1989, table 1110; and U.S. 
Dept. of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics 1992, table 550. 
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If ecological-evolutionary theory is correct, it was no mere coincidence that as the 
demands of Marxist ideology came increasingly into conflict with the potentialities of 
modern technology that the latter prevailed. Not only have the innovations introduced by 
Lenin and his successors proven less durable, they never were as profound.1 Still today, 
however, many sociologists cling to an exaggerated view of the transforming power of 
ideologies, partly because of their own strong personal commitments to various ideolo-
gies, and partly also because of their lack of familiarity with preindustrial societies. 
From the standpoint of an understanding of the process of social change in the 
modern world, it is important to recognize the degree to which ideologies reflect the in-
fluence of ecological-evolutionary theory’s three basic factors. Marxist ideology, for ex-
ample, obviously reflects the influence of the new technologies that were transforming 
western European societies in the nineteenth century. One simply cannot imagine Marxist 
ideology emerging in medieval Europe or ancient Greece, nor, alternatively, Thomistic 
theology emerging among the societies of pre-Columbian America. This is why ecologi-
cal-evolutionary theory views ideologies as intervening variables in the larger process of 
social change. 
To understand why technology has been such a powerful force in human life, we 
need to understand that technological advances are, in essence, improvements on the ba-
sic “tools” with which we are endowed by our genetic heritage – that is, our arms, our 
legs, our eyes, our ears, our brain, etc. Thus, the invention of the microscope and tele-
scope were functionally the equivalent of radical evolutionary (i.e., biological) improve-
ments in our species’ genetic heritage, as were the invention of the steam engine, the 
computer, and every other technological advance. If it is all but impossible to exaggerate 
the importance of the biological “tools” with which nature has endowed us, it is surely 
difficult to exaggerate the importance of the varied technologies that humans have created 
to extend and enhance the powers of our bodies. Simply put, technologies are the means 
by which humans satisfy all of their many material needs and desires and many of the 
nonmaterial ones as well.2 
Marxism and Ecological-Evolutionary Theory Compared 
Marxian theory, in some respects, is similar to ecological-evolutionary theory. It, too, 
recognizes the enormous transforming power of technological innovation. But Marxism 
and ecological-evolutionary theory differ in two important respects. First, they differ pro-
foundly in their assumptions concerning human nature, a difference that has far-reaching 
implications. Second, they also differ in their view of the relative strength and importance 
of technology and ideology in the modern era and this, too, is a difference that makes a 
critical difference. 
When viewed from an historical perspective, it is clear that Marx’s view of human 
nature was essentially a secularized variant of classical Christian doctrine. With classical 
Christian thinkers, Marx imagined that in the beginning there was an idyllic era in which 
human life was good and that people lived together in harmony with nature and with one 
another (i.e., in the Garden of Eden/in the era of primitive communism). During this pe-
                                                     
1) In fact, in many respects (e.g., in the concentration of power and privilege in the hands of a 
small, self-perpetuating elite) they were actually regressive. 
2) Status striving, for example, is often satisfied by the acquisition of material goods, as Veblen 
made clear in his discussion of conspicuous consumption. 
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riod, selfishness, greed, exploitation, and oppression were absent. With the emergence of 
private property or, for Christians, with the Adam’s sin and the Fall, a long era began in 
which the darker side of human nature prevailed. But, once again, paralleling Christian 
doctrine, Marx predicted that this era would shortly end and a happier time was imminent 
(i.e., the Second Coming of Christ/the era of socialism and later communism). Finally, 
where Christians, such as St. Paul, believed that faith in Christ would give rise to the new 
man in Christ, a paragon of Christian moral values, Marx predicted that the creation of a 
new social order would give rise to the new socialist man, a paragon of socialist values. 
Today, we know that Marx, like St. Paul, was much too sanguine in his expecta-
tions concerning human nature. The experience of a score or more of socialist societies 
has sadly demonstrated that the new socialist man has been even rarer than the new man 
in Christ. Furthermore, thanks to advances in the biological sciences, we now begin to 
understand why this is so. People do not enter this world like blank tablets, as John Locke 
(and Marx) supposed, waiting for environmental forces to shape our character. Rather, as 
Kenneth Boulding once wrote, “Straight from the womb we like milk, we dislike loud 
noises, and we dislike falling” [Boulding 1970: 31]. 
Because human nature is a product of the interaction of environmental influences 
with our species’ genetic heritage and, not simply a product of environmental influences, 
it is not nearly as malleable as we might wish [Lenski et al. 1995: 13-15, 26-30]. Like 
other primates (and unlike the social insects), humans are genetically programmed to 
have a strong sense of self and of self-interest. While this is often channeled into socially 
useful activities, the sense of self and self-interest is rarely, if ever, totally suppressed. 
Elman Service, the anthropologist, summed up matters best when he wrote that the task 
confronting societies is one of redirecting human selfishness rather than overcoming or 
eliminating it. 
Ecological-evolutionary theory also differs from Marxian theory in its view of the 
relative importance of technology and ideology in shaping societies in the modern era. 
Where Marx expected ideology to become the dominant revolutionary force in advanced 
industrial societies, ecological-evolutionary theory predicts that technology and, more 
specifically, technological innovation will remain dominant in social change and trans-
formation. 
This is not to suggest that ideologies are unimportant in the process of social 
change. On the contrary, ecological-evolutionary theory assumes that as technology ad-
vances, societal wealth increases, and that this provides societies with a wider range of 
options than previously, thereby increasing the potential for ideologically motivated 
change. Nevertheless, the range of options within which ideologies and their advocates 
are able to choose continues to be limited by the technologies available at the time. Fur-
thermore, technological innovation does not merely increase the range of options avail-
able, it also alters the structure of rewards and costs of all the options and thus alters the 
preferences and choices made by individuals and groups. For these reasons, then, eco-
logical-evolutionary theory regards technology as still the dominant force in social 
change--even in technologically advanced societies. 
Societal Transformation in Post-Communist Europe 
Benjamin Franklin once said that two things are certain in this world, death and taxes. 
Had he been more perceptive, he would have added a third, technological innovation. We 
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can, of course, forgive him, since in his day the rate of technological innovation was far 
less than it is today; for another of the constants throughout human history has been the 
exponential growth in the rate of technological innovation at the global level3 [Lenski et 
al. 1995: table 5.1]. 
The italicized qualification in the previous sentence is especially relevant for the 
post-Communist societies of middle and eastern Europe. By all accounts, the leadership 
of these societies during the Communist era failed to appreciate the enormous importance 
of technological innovation and change4 and created a social system that caused their so-
cieties to lose ground relative to the non-Communist societies of western Europe, Amer-
ica, and the Far East. According to one observer, the Czech Republic was only a few 
years behind western Europe technologically when the Communists seized power in the 
late 1940s, but had fallen forty years behind by the time the Communists were ousted.  
In an era when rapid advances in the technologies of transportation and communi-
cation are creating enormous pressures toward European economic union – even a global 
economy – the post-Communist societies of middle and eastern Europe have little choice 
but to try to catch up with their competitors. 
But catching up is only part of the task that lies ahead. As noted above, the rate of 
technological change is steadily accelerating. Thus, even when the process of catch-up is 
completed (if, indeed, it ever is), the Czech Republic and other post-Communist societies 
will almost certainly be subject to continuing technological innovation and change.  
Because post-Communist societies are compelled to play catch-up, it is not difficult 
to anticipate many of the changes that lie ahead for them. In other words, many of the 
changes that occur in middle and eastern Europe will be of the kind that western Euro-
pean societies have already undergone or are currently undergoing – changes of the kind 
that are often described as the emergence of “post-industrial” society. 
Like many popular concepts, the idea of “post-industrial” society can be useful, but 
it can also be misleading. Where it is most useful is in drawing attention to the many so-
cial changes that technological advances have caused; where it is misleading is in its sug-
gestion that western societies have somehow freed themselves from, and moved beyond, 
their long-standing dependence on industrial technology. For, when industrial technology 
is properly understood as technology that utilizes inanimate sources of energy (coal, oil, 
natural gas, nuclear power) to power machines that produce the material necessities of 
human life, it is clear that western societies today are no less dependent on this kind of 
technology than western societies of the last two hundred years. If anything, they are 
even more dependent! 
The revolutionary change that has given rise to the widespread use of the term, 
“post-industrial”, has been the transformation of the labor force of western societies. New 
                                                     
3) In other words, while exponential growth has continued over the long run at the global level, 
this has not always been true of each and every society. On the contrary, for various reasons the 
rate of technological change and innovation has remained stable or even declined in many indi-
vidual societies [Lenski et al. 1995: 53-55]. 
4) This may have occurred because Marxist ideology led them to overestimate the importance of 
the structural and ideological changes they made in the societies they controlled. In other words, 
they appear to have overestimated the transforming power of structural and ideological innovation 
and underestimated the power of technological. 
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technologies have drastically reduced the need for human labor in the productive process. 
Vast armies of industrial workers (Marx’s proletariat) are no longer required; fewer and 
fewer workers are able to produce more and more and usually better and better products. 
Just as newer agricultural technologies drastically lowered the demand for agricultural 
workers in the not far distant past, now newer industrial technologies are reducing the 
demand for industrial workers, and the end result is just as revolutionary. According to 
one recent forecast, opportunities for employment in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs in 
the Czech Republic will be reduced by one-quarter in just the twelve-year span from 
1993-2005 [Tuček 1993: 26-28], and the trend is not likely to end then. 
The larger social consequences of these technologically induced changes in the la-
bor force are likely to be every bit as great as those that occurred earlier in response to 
advances in agricultural technology. Large numbers of middle-aged and older workers 
will find their occupational skills rendered obsolete. How society will deal with this prob-
lem remains to be seen. 
In the United States, one of the more immediate consequences of the growing over-
supply of less skilled workers has been the failure of real wages (i.e., wages after correc-
tion for inflation) to keep pace with increases in productivity. In fact, at a time when 
productivity is increasing fairly rapidly, wages for the average worker have stagnated or 
even declined [Head 1996]. 
This problem is further aggravated by advances in the technologies of transporta-
tion, which have led to the emergence and increasingly rapid growth of the global econ-
omy. As new technologies have greatly reduced the cost of transporting goods, it has 
become increasingly profitable for employers to turn to the so-called emerging nations of 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America for semi-skilled and unskilled labor. Labor costs in these 
nations are only a fraction of the costs in advanced industrial societies.  
To make matters worse, many less skilled white collar jobs are also being rendered 
obsolete by new technologies. Networks of computers are dramatically reducing the need 
for armies of clerical workers to keep and maintain organizational files and records and 
have even begun to reduce the need for middle level managers and professional staff. 
How societies will adapt to these changes remains to be seen. One possibility is to 
reduce the length of the work week and work year, spreading opportunities for employ-
ment more widely and increasing opportunities for leisure. This approach, however, 
raises the unit costs of production and in an increasingly global market economy threat-
ens the economic security of societies that follow this path.  
An alternative response, but one that most industrial societies have been slow to 
adopt, is the establishment of a rigorous national population policy, one that not merely 
limits the natural increase of population through an excess of births over deaths but also 
limits severely or even forbids immigration from other nations. With the notable excep-
tion of Japan, elites in most industrial societies have been unwilling to adopt such policies 
since they (i.e., the elites) usually benefit from the trends that threaten or harm so many of 
their compatriots. Moreover, various currently popular ideologies confuse the issue in the 
minds of many since efforts to restrict immigration are commonly attacked as “racist” by 
opponents. 
A growing body of evidence suggests, however, that this argument is beginning to 
lose its appeal. Recent surveys have shown, for example, that a substantial majority of 
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Americans (including even members of recent immigrant groups) now favor raising bar-
riers to immigration [Federation for American Immigration Reform 1996]. 
If the various trends cited above continue, the probability of greater tensions and 
conflicts within societies is likely, especially if the more powerful members of society 
continue to benefit economically from the trends, while millions of their fellow members 
suffer. Already, a growing number of politicians in western Europe and the United States 
have begun to direct attention to the problem, but it is unclear if any have found a satis-
factory solution.5 
New technologies promise to give rise to other often unrecognized kinds of change. 
In countless subtle ways, for example, they have weakened the traditional family system. 
Children have become increasingly expensive and also increasingly free of parental con-
trol; opportunities for profitable employment for women have risen sharply, thus weaken-
ing the economic bond between men and women. In addition, new technologies of many 
kinds (e.g., frozen meals, microwave ovens, dishwashing machines) make life outside of 
marriage increasingly easy for both sexes. Finally, other new technologies (e.g., televi-
sion, the internet) provide dramatic new opportunities for those who reject traditional 
family values to promote their views. 
One could easily extend the list of changes that are likely in post-Communist socie-
ties. Since space does not allow that, I will merely restate the basic underlying thesis, 
namely, that the most revolutionary force at work in the world at large today is techno-
logical innovation. And, I would add, the prospects for slowing this force in the near-term 
future seem negligible, if only because technological innovation increases the ability of 
the more powerful members of societies to satisfy their many and varied needs and de-
sires. Halting a force such as this, will prove an extraordinarily daunting task. 
Societal Continuity in Post-Communist Europe 
If ecological-evolutionary theory is correct, there is at least one change that the peoples of 
the post-Communist societies of middle and eastern Europe should not expect: that is, a 
major change in human nature. Changes have occurred and will surely continue in what 
people say and do; but changes in their basic underlying motives and goals are unlikely. 
In short, continuity is more likely than change in this aspect of life. 
If most politicians and others were devious and self-serving in the bad old days un-
der Communist Party rule, one should not be surprised to find these patterns persisting. 
The shift from a totalitarian system to a democratic one is not likely to change basic hu-
man nature and it would be a serious mistake to expect it.  
This is not to say, however, that conditions will remain as bad as they were: the 
demise of totalitarianism and the breakup of monopoly power in the realm of politics is 
an enormously important change and should never be underestimated. But it appears too 
much to expect that the ending of Party control will bring about a radical transformation 
in basic human motivation. As General Secretary Krushchev once said, this is as likely as 
                                                     
5) The problem for which no one seems to have a solution is the competitive nature of the emerg-
ing global economy. Everyone wants the benefits of this kind of economy in the form of lower 
prices for goods and services, but no one in advanced industrial societies with their high standards 
of living wants to pay the price in terms of businesses bankrupted by their inability to compete in 
world markets and lowered standards of living for the population at large. 
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shrimps learning to whistle. Or, alternatively, as he might have said, it is about as likely 
as the emergence of the new socialist man. 
(This paper was not proofread by English editor) 
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